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ABSTRACT 
 
Introduction The success of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) 
depends on Parties’ active participation in its governance and implementation, particularly 
via biennial Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings. The COP’s efficacy is threatened by 
declining attendance and reductions in travel support for developing countries, and there are 
growing concerns about transparency and representation in country delegations amid industry 
efforts to shape their composition. 
 
Methods We examined Parties’ participation in the COP based on official meeting records, 
and the relationship between attendance and strength of tobacco control based on national 
global tobacco control reports. 
 
Results Attendance at the COP has decreased over time, and at several meetings would have 
fallen below 66% (the threshold for decision-making) if it wasn’t for high levels of 
participation among low and lower-middle income countries. Despite their higher attendance 
at COP meetings, these countries represent a smaller share of meeting attendees due to the 
smaller size of their delegations. Additionally, there has been a decline in the proportion of 
delegates from ministries of health and tobacco control focal points. Nationally, COP 
participation is correlated with stronger tobacco control policies; attendance by low-income 
countries has a strong correlation with implementation of advertising bans, while attendance 
among high- and lower-middle income countries shows a moderate correlation with 
implementation of tobacco taxes.  
 
Conclusions Supporting states to active engage in the COP is crucial for ongoing FCTC 
implementation, strengthening national capacity for tobacco control, and protecting the 
legitimacy and efficacy of global health governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Fifteen years ago, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)1 became the  first 
global health treaty negotiated under the auspices of WHO, following four years of intense 
negotiations. The development of the FCTC was unusual for its high level of Member State 
engagement, particularly that of developing countries2 whose influence was seen as a key 
factor in the strength of the resulting Convention.3 In the context of global governance – 
where the interests of poorer countries are often overshadowed by those of powerful elites4–6 
– such an achievement is to be highly prized. 
 
While the FCTC is justly hailed as a public health triumph,7,8 its success is reliant upon the 
strength and coherence of the international movement that gave rise to its existence and that 
sustains and protects its realisation in the face of persisting challenges.2 This is widely 
acknowledged with reference to the need for accelerated implementation of core FCTC 
measures at national level. There is growing evidence that such implementation accelerates 
tobacco control measures and reduces smoking prevalence.7,9 Yet while the Convention has 
now been ratified by 180 countries and the European Union,10 only an estimated 10% of the 
world’s population are protected by best practice in tobacco taxation, with comprehensive 
advertising bans and smoke-free environments covering just 15% and 20% respectively.11 
Progress in many areas is hampered by competing priorities,12 limited national capacity13 and 
the active opposition of the industry.14,15  
 
The salience of such political dynamics illustrates that there is nothing inevitable about the 
success of the FCTC process, highlighting the importance of key governance attributes. Of 
particular significance here is the Conference of the Parties (COP), the governing body 
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charged to “keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and take the 
decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation.”1 The COP met for the first time 
in Geneva in February 2006; subsequent iterations were held in Thailand (COP2, 2007), 
South Africa (COP3, 2008), Uruguay (COP4, 2010), South Korea (COP5, 2012), Russia 
(COP6, 2014), and India (COP7, 2016), with COP8 returning to Geneva in October 2018. 
Among multiple challenges confronting the COP,16 its attributes of participation and 
representation have become both politicised and increasingly vulnerable in two key respects.   
 
Firstly, the issue of travel support to enable developing country participation in the COP 
became highly contested following COP4.16,17 The active leadership role of low and lower-
middle income countries, widely seen as critical to the success of FCTC negotiations,2,3 has 
been underpinned by their receipt of travel support to enable attendance. The implementation 
of a COP4 decision to adopt a far more restrictive policy (for ‘least developed’ countries) was 
delayed during COP5-COP7 via successive ad hoc funds, with the Head of the Convention 
Secretariat warning of “a risk that the COP would no longer be quorate” (p30)18 in their 
absence.19  
 
Alongside anxiety about a widening democratic deficit in the FCTC, discussions at COP6 and 
COP7 were characterised by increasing concern about country delegations with tobacco 
industry affiliations. Potential responses to this issue included consideration of requiring 
delegates to declare any such links 20 while civil society participants at COP7 noted an 
apparent evolution in tobacco industry strategy, with some country delegations obstructively 
deploying procedural or legalistic arguments to delay discussions.21 The significance afforded 
by the tobacco industry in seeking to influence the work of the COP was subsequently 
demonstrated by an internal PMI document obtained by Reuters.22 This framed the FCTC as 
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“a regulatory runaway train” in which health concerns dominate over other interests; the 
document set out PMI’s aim to “[p]ush for a balanced delegation”, by encouraging greater 
representation of finance, foreign affairs, customs and commerce ministries in national 
delegations.23 
 
In this context, it becomes increasingly important to understand the dynamics of the COP and 
to discuss their implications for tobacco control policy. This paper aims to build on an earlier 
analysis of participation at COPs 1-416 to consider developments in countries’ participation, 
including by income group; to examine changes in the composition of delegations (with 
reference to the proportion of health officials); and to assess the relationship between 
participation in the COP and the strength of key tobacco control measures at national level.   
 
 
METHODS 
 
i) Participation in the FCTC COP 
 
Building on previous work,17 we examined trends in countries’ participation in COP from the 
first meeting in 2006 to the seventh meeting in 2016. For each of these seven meetings, we 
used official records 10, 24–30 to identify which countries were Parties to the FCTC at the time 
of the meeting, which were represented at the meeting, and (for those represented) the size 
and composition of their delegation, i.e. the number of delegates drawn from government 
departments focused on health (including tobacco control), finance, foreign affairs, and other 
areas (including agriculture and trade). Consistent with previous analyses, we categorised all 
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Parties according to their World Bank income group (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and 
high-income),31 except for a small number of Parties (Cook Islands, Niue, Nauru, Tuvalu) 
which are not included in the World Bank income classification for years where the national 
population is <300,000 (supplementary table 1). As well as being the international standard, 
the World Bank categories are updated every year – thus allowing us to re-classify countries 
whose population and/or GDP per capita increased substantially between COP sessions. 
 
We calculated Parties’ participation or ‘turnout’ at each COP based as a proportion of those 
countries that had ratified the FCTC at the time of each meeting, and examined trends in 
participation by income group. (Parties not assigned to a World Bank income category were 
excluded from analyses by income group – i.e. they were not included in the list of potential 
attendees for this analysis.) We further examined the proportion of total delegates at each 
COP that came from each income group, and the proportion of delegates affiliated with 
specific government departments (including health and non-health agencies). 
 
ii) Relationship between participation in COP and strength of tobacco control 
 
We examined the relationship between Parties’ attendance across the first seven COP 
meetings and the strength of their tobacco control policies, as stated in the 2017 global 
tobacco control reports.11 We focused on three key measures of tobacco control: increased 
taxes on tobacco products; protecting people from tobacco smoke via legislation enforcing 
smoke-free environments in public places; and bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship. (Parties to the FCTC report against six key measures of implementation, of 
which these three measures – alongside public information campaigns – are ranked on the 
Tobacco Control Scale as having the greatest impact.32 We did not use public information 
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campaigns as part of our assessment, because countries’ use of these is not consistent over 
time; that is, countries may have had no recent public information campaigns despite having 
invested in them in the past.) For each measure, we created a three-point categorisation (table 
1) across which Parties were approximately evenly distributed. That is, for each policy we 
divided Parties into three levels of implementation (minimal, partial or comprehensive) with 
each level containing approximately one third of all Parties (i.e. the ‘comprehensive’ category 
represents the top third of Parties in terms of implementation of the relevant policy – not 
necessarily those meeting the threshold for ‘best practice’ in relation to that policy).  
 
Table 1. Strength of implementation for three key tobacco control measures 
Level of 
implementation Tobacco taxation 
Smoke-free environments* Bans on advertising, sponsorship and 
promotion 
Minimal <30% of retail price 
is tax 
<=2 public places covered 
by smoke-free legislation 
Absence of ban OR ban that does not 
cover national television, radio and 
print media 
Partial 30-60% of retail 
price is tax 
3-7 public places covered 
by smoke-free legislation 
Ban on national television, radio and 
print media 
Comprehensive† >60% of retail price 
is tax 
All public places covered 
by smoke-free legislation 
Bans on all forms of direct and 
indirect advertising 
*The global tobacco control reports list seven specific public places that may be covered by smoke-free 
legislation, with an eighth category for ‘All other public places’ 
†’Comprehensive’ refers to the level of implementation reached by the top third of Parties for that measure 
(rather than ‘best practice’)  
 
We examined the relationship between Parties’ COP attendance and the strength of their 
tobacco control policies based on both categories of attendance (<=1 meetings; 2-6 meetings; 
all 7 meetings) and the total number of meetings attended (0-7). For the former (categories of 
COP attendance), we examined the correlation with the extent of implementation visually and 
by calculating Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma coefficients33 for each tobacco control 
measure. For the latter (total number of meetings attended), we used binomial logistic 
regression analysis to assess the association between COP meeting attendance and 
‘comprehensive implementation’ of each measure. 
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All statistical analyses were carried out by EP using Predictive Analytics SoftWare (IBM 
SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 22.0, 2013). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
i) Participation in the FCTC COP 
 
While Party participation in COP meetings remains extensive, it has declined over time 
(figure 1). The first COP in 2006 enjoyed very high levels of participation, with over 95% of 
all eligible countries represented at that meeting. The following 10 years saw a broad decline 
in Party ‘turnout’ which had dropped to around 75% at the last meeting in 2016.  
 
Figure 1. Participation at first seven COP meetings by all Parties* and by Parties from low and lower-middle 
income groups†, 2006-2016 
 
 
*That is, Member States that were Parties to the FCTC at the time of the relevant COP meeting 
†World Bank income categories exclude some very small states (e.g. Cook Islands, Niue) which are therefore not included 
in calculating participation by income group. 
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Participation in the COP has consistently been higher among low and lower-middle income 
countries, which typically make up around half the Parties represented at the meetings 
(supplementary table 2). At COP7, for example, attendance among eligible low- and lower-
middle income countries was 82%, while among high and upper-middle income countries it 
was only 73%. Overall, low and lower-middle income countries are more likely to have 
attended some or all of the seven COP meetings (supplementary table 3) with only 5.4% 
never attending or attending only once, compared with the 9% of high and middle-income 
countries that have attended only once or not at all. 
 
While low and lower-middle income countries are more likely to attend the COP, they tend to 
have much smaller delegations than high or upper-middle income countries. Thus delegates 
from low and lower-middle income countries have historically comprised only a quarter to a 
third of all country delegates (supplementary table 4), despite making up half the Parties 
represented at the meeting. The proportion of delegates from low and lower-middle-income 
countries has slightly increased over time and was particularly high at the last COP in India (a 
lower-middle income country), although all other COP meetings were numerically dominated 
by delegations from wealthier countries. 
 
We also found considerable variation in the composition of delegations by income group, and 
over time. Delegations from lower income countries are more likely to be drawn from 
national ministries of health and tobacco control focal points, which together comprise over 
60% of delegates from low income countries; while delegates from non-health departments 
such as foreign affairs and finance make up a greater proportion of delegations from higher 
income countries, with health departments making up just 42% of all delegates (figure 2). 
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The proportion of COP delegates drawn from ministries of health (including tobacco control 
focal points) was particularly low at COP1 in Geneva, reflecting the tendency for many 
countries to utilise their standing diplomatic representatives to the United Nations. While the 
proportion of health-focused delegates has been strikingly higher outside of Geneva, this has 
tended to decrease over time (table 2); from a high of almost two-thirds of delegates at COP3, 
at the most recent COP session (COP7) in 2016, ministries of health contributed only a third 
of all meeting delegates. 
 
Figure 2. Institutional affiliation* of national delegates attending COP meetings (2006-2016) from low and 
high income countries. 
 
*‘Health’, Ministry of Health or equivalent; ‘TC focal point’, national focal point for tobacco control (usually within Ministry 
of Health); ‘Foreign Affairs’, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Missions or equivalent; ‘Finance’, Ministry of Finance, 
Treasury or equivalent; ‘Agriculture’, Ministry of Agriculture or equivalent; ‘Trade’, Ministry of Trade, Commerce or 
equivalent; ‘Other’, all other categories including other government departments (e.g. Justice), delegates described by role 
(‘scientist’, ‘expert’ etc), delegates from non-governmental institutions, and delegates with no institutional descriptor. 
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Table 2. Proportion of delegates from health ministries (including tobacco control focal points) by COP 
session and income group 
Year   
(location) of 
COP meeting 
Total 
delegates     
at meeting 
Proportion of meeting delegates from national health ministries                        
(including tobacco control focal points) by income group* 
Low Lower Middle 
Upper 
Middle High 
All income 
groups 
COP1: 2006 
(Switzerland) 474 42.1% 40.7% 34.8% 37.9% 35.5% 
COP2: 2007            
(Thailand) 396 85.3% 77.0% 53.9% 48.3% 58.3% 
COP3: 2008                 
(South Africa) 412 94.9% 70.3% 61.7% 46.9% 62.1% 
COP4: 2010             
(Uruguay) 457 75.5% 63.7% 45.9% 42.7% 52.1% 
COP5: 2012             
(South Korea) 508 65.5% 50.0% 36.3% 40.2% 43.9% 
COP6: 2014             
(Russia) 489 62.8% 40.5% 30.9% 37.7% 38.7% 
COP7: 2016             
(India) 673 32.6% 31.8% 34.7% 41.4% 35.0% 
 
 
ii) Relationship between participation in COP and strength of tobacco control 
 
We found evidence of a correlation between Parties’ attendance at COP meetings and the 
strength of their national tobacco control policies, as indicated by our three chosen measures. 
The proportion of Parties with comprehensive implementation of policies (for tobacco 
taxation, smoke-free environments and advertising bans) increased with increasing frequency 
of attendance at the COP meetings (figure 3). This relationship is clearest for taxation and 
advertising bans (gamma coefficient = 0.35 for both), and weakest for smoke-free policies 
(gamma coefficient = 0.29). 
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Figure 3. Strength of Parties’ tobacco control policies (% with minimal, partial and comprehensive 
implementation) by frequency of COP attendance 
 
 
Attendance at each additional COP session (from 1-7) was associated with an increased 
likelihood of Parties being in the most comprehensive category of tobacco control, although 
this was statistically significant only for taxation. For each additional COP meeting attended, 
the odds ratio for comprehensive implementation was 1.28 (95% confidence interval (CI) 
1.08-1.52) for taxation, 1.19 (95% CI 1.00-1.41) for smoke-free policies, and 1.24 (95% CI 
1.00-1.53) for advertising bans. 
 
The strength of this relationship appears to be mediated by income group as well as the 
specific tobacco control measure examined (supplementary table 5). When we stratified 
Parties by income, we found that low-income countries showed a particularly strong 
correlation between COP attendance and implementation of advertising bans (gamma 
coefficient = 0.65). High-income and lower-middle income countries showed a moderate 
correlation between COP attendance and implementation of tobacco taxes (coefficient = 0.38 
and 0.37 respectively), while upper-middle income countries showed a moderate correlation 
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between COP attendance and implementation of smoke-free environments (coefficient = 
0.31). We were unable to perform logistic regression by income sub-group as small numbers 
in some cells meant the model was unstable.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our findings reveal some important trends in relation to FCTC Parties’ participation in COP 
meetings. First, attendance at the COP has declined steadily over time, from 96% at the first 
COP to 75% at the seventh. Second, participation in COP meetings is consistently higher 
among low and lower-middle income countries, although these Parties tend to have much 
smaller delegations and are therefore less numerically dominant at COP meetings than high 
and upper-middle income countries. Third, a greater proportion of delegates from low and 
lower-middle income countries (LLMICs)come from national ministries of health (including 
national tobacco control focal points), in part reflecting the status of these ministries as 
recipients of travel support. Overall, the smaller size of delegations from low and lower-
middle income countries means that the composition of COP meetings is reflective of more 
wide-ranging high and middle-income delegations, which tend to include substantially more 
representatives from non-health ministries (particularly foreign affairs and finance). 
 
 
Participation in the COP is important for maintaining representation and accountability in 
both formal decision-making terms and with respect to the legitimacy and efficacy of the 
COP as a negotiating forum. A turnout rate of 66% is required for the COP to be able to take 
decisions.34 While attendance to date has remained above this level, the general downward 
trend raises the possibility that turnout at a future COP meeting could drop below the 
14 
 
 
required threshold for the session to be able to perform its crucial governance functions. In 
addition to jeopardising the formal requirement for quoracy, the experience of other global 
governance mechanisms suggests that declining attendance could trigger diverse problems 
including reduced buy-in from disenfranchised Parties, weakened legitimacy and 
accountability, and – ultimately – stalling of progress on FCTC implementation. This 
highlights the potential seriousness of problems posed to the work and viability of the COP, 
underpinning the risk for tobacco control of sleepwalking towards chaos in the absence of 
support that can ensure effective participation.  
 
In relation to participation by low and lower-middle-income countries, their strong attendance 
record highlights their importance in maintaining adequate representation at COP meetings. 
Participation rates for high and upper-middle income Parties have fallen below 66% at three 
of the seven COP meetings (supplementary table 2), meaning these meetings have been 
crucially reliant on much higher levels of attendance among low and lower-middle income 
countries. The decision to substantially reduce travel support to the majority of these 
countries28 could therefore have serious consequences, not only for their representation and 
involvement in decision-making, but for the viability of the entire COP process.  
 
Beyond the basic issues of numbers, it will be important to monitor both participation and 
discussions emerging from the eighth COP in Geneva in order to address key questions 
regarding the governance dynamics of tobacco control and global health. It seems almost 
certain that the proportion of COP delegates drawn from ministries of health will continue to 
decline, given the understandable pressures on financially straitened governments to rely on 
diplomatic missions to provide representation. Additionally, the fact that the Illicit Trade 
Protocol came into effect in 2018 means that COP8 and subsequent COP sessions will be 
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immediately followed by the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (MOP). While interested 
high income countries will be able to send complex and extensive delegations drawing on 
expertise from across multiple ministries, countries struggling to send a minimalist delegation 
might be expected to send an official from, for example, customs and excise rather than 
health.   
 
It is, of course, highly desirable that the COP (and MOP) should be able to engage with and 
work across multiple ministries and policy spheres. Yet such a shift also clearly aligns, 
however inadvertently, with PMI’s desire to “[m]ove tobacco issues away from [health]” by 
“push[ing] for a balanced delegation”; that is, one with much stronger representation from 
ministries of finance, commerce and industry.23 The tobacco industry’s desire to undermine 
the pre-eminence of health officials at the COP serves as a reminder that the wider primacy of 
health goals in addressing tobacco issues within the UN system and global governance is 
neither inevitable nor unchallenged. WHO did not assume lead status on tobacco issues 
within the UN until the development of the FCTC2; some agencies, notably the International 
Labour Organization, have been strikingly reluctant to manage risks of tobacco industry 
interference in policy35; and it cannot be assumed that governance instruments established to 
promote health will not be subverted to advance other agendas. The potential for the tobacco 
industry to appropriate core aspects of the ITP, including by countries adopting the industry-
designed product pack marker system CODENTIFY36,37 (now Inexto Suite) emphasises the 
need to buttress the strength of health-oriented officials in delegations for FCTC negotiations.   
 
This case is reinforced by our analysis demonstrating a broad correlation between Parties’ 
attendance at the COP and the strength of their national tobacco control policies, as indicated 
by legislation on tobacco taxation, smoke-free public places and bans on advertising, 
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promotion and sponsorship. This finding is perhaps unsurprising, since attendance at the COP 
and implementation of key FCTC measures will both be linked to a country’s commitment to 
and capacity for advancing tobacco control16,38; while, less positively, low levels of COP 
attendance and weak implementation of tobacco control may reflect low political 
commitment or be linked with higher levels of industry involvement in national policy.15 Yet 
this correlation also speaks to the value of countries’ participation in global health 
governance in terms of democratic participation, policy engagement and capacity-building. 
COP meetings are a forum for exchanging information and experience, promoting best 
practice, and increasing awareness of both threats and opportunities to effective tobacco 
control 16, and participation can be expected to both strengthens and be strengthened by 
delegates’ commitment to reducing the future health burden of tobacco.39 This relationship 
may be particularly important for low income countries, in whom we found the strongest 
correlation between COP attendance and implementation of advertising bans (often seen as 
one of the first steps in a national tobacco control strategy40). Such dynamics have long been 
viewed as central to the wider process impacts of the FCTC, with information exchange seen 
as crucial to accelerating policy diffusion.41 In turn this suggests that there is a strong case for 
viewing strong investment in travel support, which may be viewed as something of a 
bureaucratic burden, as a core investment in global tobacco control; maximising Parties’ 
participation in the COP should be framed as an important mechanism for advancing 
implementation of the FCTC. 
 
Our study has some limitations, most notably its reliance on official records for details of 
Parties’ participation – which indicate numbers registered as attending, but not the level or 
quality of their participation. Our classification of delegates’ institutional affiliation is also 
imperfect, since some delegates are listed in official records without an institutional 
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affiliation, a smaller number are affiliated with non-government agencies such as research 
institutes, and non-governmental personnel (e.g. from NGOs or academia) occasionally sit in 
meetings as part of national delegations. Our reliance on World Bank categories of national 
income meant we were unable to classify some very small states (such as the Cook Islands 
and Niue) that are not included in this classification. Finally, our assessment of the strength 
of national tobacco control policy focuses on the presence (or absence) of specific legislation 
– which will not capture more nuanced aspects such as the extent of enforcement or 
budgetary commitments to tobacco control. We have not sought to assess other aspects of 
FCTC implementation in which there may be important distinctions between income groups, 
including countries’ contributions to treaty funding and their support for establishing a 
financing mechanism such as a global fund. 
 
More broadly, while our data demonstrate important trends in COP participation they do not 
speak directly to the reasons for Parties’ attendance or non-attendance (for example, how 
decisions regarding attendance might be affected by the location of a COP, or whether the 
holding of regional meetings that aim to develop consensus positions in advance of the COP 
might reduce the perceived importance of attending. Our results point to the need for more in-
depth qualitative research to factors influencing Parties’ participation in the COP (and 
Protocol’s MOP) and to identifying potential barriers and facilitators. Developing such 
understanding is critical to realising the potential of the COP as a beacon of effective, 
democratic global health governance. 
 
In conclusion, our study highlights the importance of maintaining structural support to protect 
Parties’ participation in the COP, particularly that of low and lower-middle income countries. 
The FCTC has rightly been hailed as a rare example of effective global governance in which 
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developing countries have played a significant role,3,42 but its ongoing success and 
effectiveness are not a given. In many respects the FCTC remains surprisingly fragile; its 
financial basis and support structure still require further development.16 Maintaining high 
levels of representation and participation at the COP requires sustained attention on the 
policy agenda alongside maximizing transparency in delegations and developing a strategic 
framework for FCTC implementation. 
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What this paper adds 
- The success of WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) depends 
on Member States’ ongoing engagement in its governance, including appropriate 
representation and prioritisation of health goals at the Conference of Parties (COP). 
This is threatened by potential declines in attendance and tobacco industry attempts to 
influence delegations in order to delay progress on implementation 
- Parties’ participation in the COP has declined over time and would have fallen below 
the threshold for decision-making without high levels of representation from low and 
lower-middle income countries, many of whom have lost travel support for attendance 
- Lower developing country attendance is likely to shift the composition of COP 
meetings away from health officials and towards other interests, which comprise a 
greater proportion of delegates from high income countries 
- Member States’ attendance at COP meetings is associated with more comprehensive 
implementation of national tobacco control policies, suggesting a link between active 
participation in the FCTC and national capacity for advancing tobacco control and 
resisting industry interference in policymaking 
- Renewed support for participation in the COP is crucial in order to protect the 
legitimacy and efficacy of global governance for tobacco control and health 
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